What if there were ways to look at a starter’s performance and decide a move to the bullpen would allow him to be just as effective, if not more? Suddenly we are able to judge a move to the pen as potentially more than “moving him for the sake of moving him.” There are a few things that factor into moving a starter to the bullpen —peak fastball velocity outliers, pitch velocity trends from season to season, and third time through the order success rate. Over the past several years, Andrew Miller, Joe Kelly, Seth Lugo, and Brad Peacock are just a handful of starters who saw successful transitions to the bullpen. Looking ahead, starters like the Cardinals’ Carlos Martinez, the Indians’ Danny Salazar, and the Cubs’ Jose Quintana could see similar success based on the factors listed above.

Pitch velocity is useful in numerous ways when looking at players within the organization. It is one of the factors that goes into evaluating a pitcher’s ability to limit quality contact. For the sake of deciphering whether or not to move a starting pitcher to the bullpen, it is necessary to look at what his average fastball velocity (vFA) looks like in comparison to his peak fastball velocity (pFA). The greater the difference between the two probably tells us that, while that particular pitcher possesses the ability to throw at his peak velocity, his body limits him from doing it as often as he’d like.

Among all qualified SP’s Martinez has the third fastest vFA in the MLB since 2016 (96.7). In 2018, Martinez’ vFA was 95.6, easily the lowest of his six-year career. In a smart move by the Cardinals, he was actually moved to the bullpen upon his return from a stint on the disabled list. While one might look down upon his decrease in vFA, his pFA was a strong 98.8 mph. The average of his ten fastest fastballs of the season was equally as dominant at 98.3 mph. He is fully capable of throwing a consistent 98 mph, but as the games and the season progress, arm fatigue sets in. By moving him to the pen full-time, Martinez would be able to spend a greater amount of effort in one, two, even three innings as opposed to losing effectiveness and velocity over the course of the game as a starter. In fact, six of Martinez’ ten fastest pitches in 2018 came in relief, which is meaningful considering only 15% of his innings came as a reliever. Over his last 12 appearances out of the bullpen, he actually raised his vFA to 96.3 mph, almost a full mile per hour faster than the 95.5 mph he produced as a starter. Martinez saw the effect of this in his numbers with an ERA of 1.47, 25% strikeout rate, and a .236 wOBA-against as a reliever. When taking the vFA of his ten fastest pitches (98.3) and the vFA of his ten slowest pitches (90.6), the difference was over 7 mph. His slowest pitch after moving to the bullpen was 92.5 mph. The improvement in quality of his stuff as well as the results make him a very valuable bullpen piece. Moving him back to the rotation could prove costly in having him at peak effectiveness for the duration of the season.

Like Martinez, Salazar has spent his short career among the top of the vFA leaderboards. However also similar to Martinez, Salazar’s difference in the vFA of his ten fastest pitches and his ten slowest pitches was over 7 mph. Nine of his 12 slowest pitches came after the all-star break, and he has battled arm troubles since his first full big league season in 2015. With high-quality stuff and a knack for losing fastball effectiveness over time, Salazar is a prime candidate to move to the bullpen. Injuries aren’t guaranteed to be cured by limiting innings as there are studies disputing correlations between arm injuries and pitch/inning counts. However, it could be worth a try due to the decline in velocity trends.

The third pitcher I chose to identify doesn’t quite have the velocity that Martinez and Salazar possess. While Quintana doesn’t throw 96+ mph, he has maintained a solid — if unspectacular — 92.3 vFA over the last six seasons. In today’s game, where the Martinezes and Salazars of the world are becoming more common, it is incredibly difficult to limit an offense a third time through the lineup with a 92 mph fastball. From 2013–2016, Quintana’s average seasonal pFA was 96 mph. Since then, he’s seen it drop each of the last three seasons — 96.1 in 2016, 95.2 in 2017, and 94.6 in 2018. Similar to what we saw when Martinez moved to the bullpen, his fastball-low would most likely rise. There would also probably be less disparity between his vFA and pVA because of the opportunity to spend a greater amount of effort while throwing less pitches.

Martinez and Salazar both throw very hard. But in addition to the velocity trends over time, another factor in turning starters into relievers is the ability to pitch to a lineup a third time through (TTT). From 2016–2017, Martinez was top 25% in the league with a solid TTT wOBA against of .312. However, he took a step back in 2018, posting a TTT wOBA against of .334. Health was most likely the biggest culprit in the decline of TTT production, but that doesn’t bode well for his future prospects as a starter. The more innings he compiles, the more he risks losing his elite velocity and effectiveness. By no longer worrying about getting through the 6–7 innings in each start, Martinez avoids facing a lineup more than once (maybe twice) and can more efficiently use his best fastball, which shouldn’t be hard considering his track record. Via Statcast, Martinez has thrown the third most amount of pitches 99+ mph over the last three seasons. The ability has always been there, but in order to prolong Martinez’ best stuff, moving to the bullpen is for the best.

Salazar over the last few years has been part of the bottom half of pitchers with at least 30 innings pitched against a lineup the third time through. From 2016–2017, Salazar ranked 98th out of 160 with a TTT wOBA against of .344. His ineffectiveness after the second time through the lineup is a major indicator that Salazar should be permanently moved to the pen. It is in no way implying that Salazar can’t be an effective starting pitcher, but in order to get the best value from him, moving him to the pen prolongs his elite fastball and effectiveness. Like Martinez, he has ace-like stuff. However, ace-like stuff doesn’t get you very far if you only have it for a short amount of time.

Any potential move to the bullpen for Quintana would also be fueled by his lousy TTT production. Among pitchers with 20 or more innings pitched TTT in 2018, Quintana ranked 126 out of 136 with a wOBA against of .399. For reference, perennial MVP candidate, Nolan Arenado, has a .391 wOBA over the past three seasons. Simply put, Quintana isn’t good after the opposing team sees him twice.

In the chart above, we see how successful Martinez, Salazar, and Quintana were in 2017 when facing a lineup for the third time in a game. Aside from that year, it hasn’t been too encouraging. Quintana and Salazar have been average to well below average and Martinez has fluctuated above and below Major League average since 2015.

Several organizations have begun moving towards the direction of “bullpenning” — building an abundant stable of arms that is capable of coming in at any point in the game after using an “opener” who will go two to four innings as opposed to the generic six that starters have been historically asked to get through. We saw it gain momentum in the 2017 playoffs with the Indians using Miller in a “fireman” role, often entering in inning four or five as opposed to the eighth or ninth like traditional setup men and closers. We’ve seen it in the 2018 regular season with the Tampa Bay Rays, and we saw it carry over into the 2018 playoffs with the Oakland A’s, Atlanta Braves, and Milwaukee Brewers. While the vFA in Major League Baseball has increased, the average length of start has decreased every year since 2014 from 6 innings to 5.4 innings. Relying on a dominant bullpen has become increasingly necessary. Certain teams are cleverly using that to their advantage in asking pitchers to get through shorter-inning stints, thus allowing them to increase effort and in turn throw harder. The aforementioned factors that could potentially hold Martinez, Salazar, and Quintana back as traditional starters are the exact reasons why they should move to a high leverage relief role. Shorter appearances allow for greater effort and more pitches closer to their pFA. In addition to a positive effect on their fastballs, their numbers should increase as well by not having to face a lineup more than one or two times. “Bullpenning” will get become more common as organizations see the success it has and these three pitchers would flourish as high-leverage “firemen.”

Each of these pitchers has the necessary ability to be a number one or number two starting pitcher in a team’s rotation. They’ve proven in the past that when they take the mound they can be dominant. And still, the concerning velocity trends and the lack of consistent success third time through the opponent’s lineup makes a move to the bullpen for the three of them all the more enticing. If not for the probable immediate increase in effectiveness, then certainly for the elongation of that effectiveness. It’s not likely to happen, at least not this year. Each is both good enough and young enough to right the ship before it’s too late, there is some risk in letting them try. Ultimately, using them in a high-leverage relief role could raise their value tremendously, where they can enter the game at any point. They are too valuable on the mound to risk minimizing the amount of time they’re at their peak effectiveness. Send ’em to the pen.

Before we jump into his actual production, I think it’s important to note how Hall of Fame voting *should* take place. Player X should be evaluated in comparison to the others at his position when it comes to his hitting or pitching production. Comparing Larry Walker (right field) and Mike Piazza (catcher) would be less than ideal because the two played vastly different positions that included varying positional adjustments, as well as different expected positional run production — it is a lot more difficult to sustain a high level of run creation as a catcher, shortstop, centerfielder than say a corner outfielder or first basemen because of the toll playing those positions have on one’s body over the course of a season/career. Each position has its own variables that need to be taken into account and we are doing players a disservice while making a comparison if we note those variables for one player, while not even having the option of doing so for the other. Now, player value based on WAR is a bit different in that it is already weighted to balance out the positional scale, so to speak. So it’s easier to compare a catcher and a shortstop through WAR. I prefer comparing players to others at their position because it is a more seamless comparison. While WAR does a good job of balancing out those different variables, we still get a better picture of how good a player was at his particular position if we compare him to the entirety of that position.

In addition to focusing on the position group, I think it’s important to not get too caught up in the longevity of a player’s career, to an extent. Sure, if a player plays five years in the bigs and dominates each year before a career ending injury, then he probably shouldn’t be enshrined in the Hall of Fame. However, if someone plays 11 seasons and is dominant at his position for the majority of his career, a player who plays 20 seasons and is dominant for the same amount of years before significantly dropping off at the tail end of his career shouldn’t gain more merit simply because they played nine more years of below average to average baseball. Looking at WAR on a per season, per game, or per X amount of plate appearances basis would allow very worthy and underrated players to shine more than usual because they didn’t play excessive sub-replacement level years. In addition, it would allow us to see how some “legends” may have underperformed more than we were lead to believe.

Which leads us back to Wright…in terms of production over the course of one’s career, Wright is right there with the best of them. Among all third basemen with at least 6000 plate appearances since 1900, Wright sits tenth in wRC+ at 133, 16th in wOBA at .373, and ninth in OPS. Of the 34 third basemen with at least 350 career doubles, only one has less plate appearances than Wright, who sits 24th on the all time doubles list with 390. He is one of four third basemen in baseball history to hit more than 200 home runs and steal more than 190 bases in his career. Wright was the 12th most valuable third basemen at the plate in terms of offensive runs above average (“Off” on Fangraphs).

With offensive studs like Wade Boggs and George Brett closest to Wright in batting value, it’s fair to wonder why Wright doesn’t get more Hall of Fame love outside of Mets fandom. Of the top 30 third basemen in career WAR, Wright’s 52.3 sits a solid, yet probably unworthy of the Hall of Fame, 26th. What changes his outlook and makes that more impressive is that only two of those 30 played less games than Wright. Having found it difficult to find WAR data turned into rate stats rather than counting stats, I took the top 30 third basemen in career WAR and turned their total WAR into a WAR per 150 games played (WAR/150). It was very interesting to see certain guys already in the Hall of Fame drop, like Brooks Robinson, as well as seeing guys currently campaigning to get in rise, like Scott Rolen and Edgar Martinez (yeah, he was a 3B for a while before switching to DH). But for the purpose of the article, let’s stay focused on Wright.

*Note: I used 150 games instead of a full slate of 162 because it is incredibly uncommon for a player to play in all 162 games. There will be rest days, minor tweaks and bruises, etc.

While current members of the Hall like Brett, Santo, and Robinson did it longer, Wright was better than them on a per season basis. Don’t get it wrong, there is a lot to be said about someone who played at the highest level for a longer period of time, but if someone’s career ends after 11 seasons worth of games compared to 19 for another, we have to take into account what those players did on a per season basis. Career longevity should not be the ultimate deciding factor. Eleven full seasons in addition to three part time seasons, like Wright’s, is a lengthy career, yet it gets lost in translation when put up against certain Hall of Fame members who played an absurd 18+ seasons. For some reason the voting committee is infatuated with players who played well past their prime — when majority of those guys were borderline worthless in the twilight of their careers — like it’s some skill to take the field and produce at a sub-replacement level.

There are two third basemen in the Hall who played the same or less seasons than Wright. He sits ninth all-time with a WAR/150 of 4.95 — .05 WAR away from being one of nine third basemen to average five wins every full season. This tells us that while he wasn’t on the field as long as other Hall members, he was one of the most dominant at his position when he was. Fangraphs classifies a 4–5 WAR player as “All-Star” and 5–6 as “Superstar.” Given that scale, Wrights 11 full seasons worth of games at a All-Star to Superstar level of play is quite remarkable and vastly under-appreciated.

Another method I used in converting WAR into a rate stat was through WAR per 100 plate appearances (WAR/100 PA). Similar to the changes we saw when converting WAR to WAR/150, several players can be better identified as having a better Hall of Fame case, including Wright. Of the third basemen already enshrined, only five were more valuable per 100 PA than Wright was. Again, it appears as if voters like to add extra value to players who play more years, even if those years would’ve served the team better without that player.

A perfect example, and excuse the aside from Wright’s Hall of Fame case, of a player‘s career going far too long is Ken Griffey Jr. Now, before you get all upset, let it be known that I am in no way suggesting Junior should not be in the Hall of Fame. He should have been a unanimous induction, but for some reason couldn’t get three writers to include him on their ballot. However, the fact that he played 22 seasons should not have played into the decision to vote him in. Over his first 12 seasons, “the Kid” jumped out to an other-worldly 74.2 WAR — which without his last ten seasons would be good for sixth best all time amongst center fielders. Over those last ten years, he accumulated a WAR of 3.5. His counting stats kept piling up thanks to an extra decade, which masked his uselessness on a per season basis over that same decade. Using the WAR rate stats discussed earlier, Griffey’s first 12 seasons would’ve produced a WAR/150 of 6.63 (well above “MVP” level as described on Fangraphs WAR scale) and a WAR/100 PA of 1.01 (as seen on the chart above, only one third basemen with more than 6000 PA in the history of baseball averaged a WAR/100 of > 1). Thanks to his fantastically dreadful final decade, his career WAR/150 dropped to 4.36 and his WAR/100 PA to .69. If you broke up Griffey Jr. into two players, the first ending his career after those first 12 seasons and the second being the same Griffey Jr. who played all 22 seasons, the one who played just 12 would’ve had the more impressive career. For some reason we as fans, media, and other baseball community members have such an inclination to rely on counting stats to judge a player’s career, yet if we look between the lines, we see how misleading they can be.

Shifting back to Wright, two stats on Baseball-Reference that are excellent at portraying a player’s Hall of Fame worthiness in comparison to those already enshrined at his position are WAR7 (WAR over a player’s 7-year peak, not necessarily consecutive seasons) and JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score System). This is where we see some reasoning as to why Wright might not be suited for the Hall. The average WAR7 amongst third basemen in the Hall of Fame is 42.9 and the average JAWS is 55.6. Wright compares slightly below those averages at 40.2 WAR7 and 45.3 JAWS. In Wright’s case, I’m skeptical of putting too much emphasis on this compared to WAR/150 or WAR/100 PA. The reason his JAWS is farther from the Hall of Fame average than his WAR7 is because JAWS uses a player’s seven-year peak and averages it with the rest of a player’s career. As we saw over the last three seasons of Wright’s career, he couldn’t even play more than 38 games which expresses his value in JAWS as lower than his WAR/150 or WAR/100 PA might suggest.

All in all, the odds of David Wright making the Hall of Fame are slim, and I wouldn’t be totally surprised to see him stay on the ballot for just a couple of years. But based on his production and value through a per season perspective, Wright’s case is stronger than anyone thought — including myself. From his second year in the bigs in 2005 until 2013, Wright was the 4th most valuable player in all of baseball. While not voted by the media, he was far and away the most valuable player in the National League in 2007. Wright’s unfortunate injury ended his career earlier than I’m sure he had hoped. Luckily his value rate stats show that he belongs in the Hall of Fame discussion. Even if that’s a long shot, it should still be a sign that Hall of Fame voting needs an adjustment and the reliance on previous factors and misleading numbers is outdated.

Having spent most of the last decade cellar-dwelling, they are running out of time to make the most of having one of the five best hitters in baseball — Joey Votto. Even Votto hasn’t been able to save them from inescapable bottom-of-the-division finishes. Yet after a trade with the Los Angeles Dodgers, there’s a small probability that we may get to see that change this season. The big names of the trade, Yasiel Puig, Matt Kemp, and Alex Wood, all make their way to the Queen City, while Homer Bailey and change head back Los Angeles’ way with Bailey expected to be released within the coming weeks. You’d think with three All-Star names such as the aforementioned going to Cincinnati, people would be paying more attention to the Reds. However, with the Dodgers being one of the top-4 players in the Bryce Harper sweepstakes, it seems like the public wants to spend its time clamoring over the assumed inevitability of Harper going to LA following the Dodgers clearing of two outfield spots and a ton of dough. As much as I’d love to speculate on uncertainty, the Reds are doing things that should certainly incite excitement.

Luckily, I’m here to give Cincy the attention it deserves after the first three months of the offseason. While this latest move was quite the splash, the Reds were actually having a quietly solid offseason. Having won an unimposing 67 games in 2018, it appeared as if they had their sights set on the future with a solid farm-system, and a decent, yet unimpressive offense mixed with a severe lack of pitching on the big league club. The organization was being left behind by other teams who had modernized their player development and moved in an analytical and technological direction. Desperate for change, they hired former San Francisco Giants’ VP of Player Development, David Bell, to be their new manager. Having little managerial experience, aside from a minor league stint, Bell worked as the St. Louis Cardinals bench coach from 2015–2017. In 2017, he took the job in the Giants organization in an attempt to modernize their player development department (Byrne, par. 3). He wanted to utilize the vast amount of data and information available that other teams had already begun taking advantage of. In Bell, the Reds are joining the data and analytics movement that is providing baseball with so much growth and progress. Bell brought on previous Dodgers hitting coach, Turner Ward, to fill the same position with the Reds. Ward was instrumental in the development of one of the most lethal offenses in the bigs as well as the back-to-back National League Champions, and while not relevant until the Reds made their move for Puig, Ward is often known as “the Puig Whisperer” — something that will come in handy throughout 2019. Without having made a major on-field personnel move, the Reds were already brightening up their future trajectory.

At the conclusion of the 2018 season, it was pretty hard to just pick one hole for the Reds to fix. But their first significant player personnel move was made in order to make sure their bullpen didn’t get any worse in the future. Raisel Iglesias was extended for 3-years, $35 million, which was crucial considering the Reds had the 7th worst combined relief pitcher WAR and 9th worst xFIP (expected fielding independent pitching). Iglesias himself also had a down year, but he has a career 2.97 ERA, 3.46 FIP, and 10 K/9. All are extremely good numbers, and given the state of the rest of their bullpen, he was too valuable to let walk next season. At 28 years old, his 3-year contract is extremely team friendly. The bullpen is still a glaring weakness, and should their 2019 look similar to 2018, he becomes a great trade chip for a team looking to get a top relief pitcher on a reasonable contract. There is a good probability that Iglesias regresses back to his good career averages, but he alone can’t fix the overall state of the pen. Guys like Jared Hughes and David Hernandez are solid, if unspectacular, pieces, but at ages 32 and 33, they will most likely not be included in the organization’s future plans. If the Reds were smart, they would invest more in the incredibly deep free agent pool of relievers.

Next, Cincinnati aimed to find one starter who could shore up their bottom-5 pitching staff. The Reds starting pitchers combined to finish 2018 with the 6th worst ERA, 4th worst FIP, and 5th worst WAR (they were worth a combined 4.5 wins…), all while finishing bottom half of the league in K/9. Safe to say there was room for improvement. They aimed to revamp the rotation by trading for Tanner Roark from the Washington Nationals. While not flashy based on first glance at his numbers, this move was incredibly underrated. If one were to look at Roark’s season long numbers, his 4.34 ERA/4.27 FIP/4.42 xFIP line definitely underwhelms and fails to impress. However, his second half line of 3.43 ERA/3.85 FIP/4.23 xFIP tells a different story and falls in line with his career averages. By no means a Major League ace, Roark has spent multiple years as a part of a winning club in the regular season and has done so at a productive level. Taking advantage of his poor first half allowed Cincinnati to get a slight discount on a solid starting pitcher that is a clear upgrade for their staff. Luis Castillo has shown flashes of ace-like stuff, and with another year of development we may get to see him put it all together in year three. Cincinnati still has former top prospect Robert Stephenson who, if healthy, will provide them with another plus-stuff arm for the rotation.

The addition of Wood, Puig, and Kemp was the big flashy offseason move for the Reds. Wood can be a high-level starter or be a valuable addition to the bullpen, depending on what management decides to do with him. If they should decide to put him in the rotation, a 1–2–3–4 of Castillo-Wood-Roark-Stephenson suddenly becomes a sneaky good (and young) combination — Castillo and Stephenson are under team control for several more years. Should Wood be put in a high leverage bullpen role in tandem with Iglesias, Cincinnati would have a 1–2 punch at the back end of their bullpen that they haven’t had in some time.

While Wood is a significant piece and will add value to a struggling pitching staff (Woods 2018 WAR of 2.6 was more than half of the entire Reds’ starting pitchers combined), Puig will most likely make the biggest difference. In 2018, the Reds had five players with 175 or more plate appearances in their lineup with a wOBA of .335 or higher — Votto (1B), Scooter Gennett (2B), Eugenio Suarez (3B), Scott Schebler (RF/CF) and Jesse Winker (LF). The Reds will most likely be replacing defensive-minded and offensively inept Billy Hamilton (career wOBA of .279) with Puig. By doing so, Cincinnati downgrades a bit on defense — Hamilton’s 2018 UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) was a rock solid 5.9 — but the upgrade on offense makes it well worth it. Last season, Cincinnati trotted out Adam Duvall in LF for 89 games before trading him mid-season. His production was well below average. Following his departure, Phillip Ervin played the most innings in LF, splitting time with Winker, who also spent time in RF. While better than Duvall, Ervin’s production was quite average. Inserting Puig into the lineup in place of Hamilton and affording Winker a full time role in place of Duvall/Ervin is going to take the Reds’ offense to a new level. With seven hitters (not including top prospect Nick Senzel who could hit the ground running in his first full season) who can realistically produce 20 more runs above the replacement level player, the Reds have a decent chance of being a top 5–7 offense in baseball. We could very well be looking at the 2019 version of last seasons’ Colorado Rockies.

A look at this graph shows just how much of an improvement Puig and Kemp will be. Hamilton’s WAR was 1.3. The Duvall/Ervin combo was 1.1. Both Kemp and Puig contributed more wins above replacement in significantly less at-bats. Not to mention, both of them have spent their careers (majority for Kemp) hitting in the pitchers’ park that is Dodgers Stadium. In 2018, Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati was the 4th best hitters’ ballpark according to ESPN’s Park Factor statistic. For reference, Dodger Stadium was the 26th ranked hitters’ ballpark (5th worst). With an extended amount of plate appearances in a ballpark that provides a higher probability of run production, Puig is set up for really awesome numbers. And that’s not even taking into account the fact that Puig will continue to work with his hitting coach from the past three seasons. Over a full season, he will attribute much more value than either Hamilton or Duvall did over the past 3–4 seasons. According to Fangraphs’ Steamer projection model, we can expect Puig to have a wOBA of .352 and a wRC+ of 125.

As for Kemp, Steamer projections have him falling back down to Earth a bit and for good reason. His batting average on balls in play (BABIP) was uncharacteristically high during the first half of 2018, resulting in a jump in numbers. Once his BABIP regressed down to his career averages, his numbers dwindled as the season went on. Steamer has Kemp set up for a .348 wOBA and 106 wRC+ in a part time role. Kemp hits left handed pitching really well, but is a liability on defense. While not as impactful as Puig, Kemp will still bring value to an offense that has lacked big bats and proven run producers. Keeping him off the field against righties will enhance the team’s defense and allow him to be a valuable contributor on offense when in the lineup.

And we haven’t even discussed what Jesse Winker can do over the course of a full season. The former top prospect had a great 2018, albeit in a less-than-full-time position. With an increase in plate appearances in 2019, Winker should be a catalyst for the team’s offense, especially with veteran All-Stars like Puig, Kemp, Votto, and Gennett providing ample support. Since debuting in 2017, Winker actually has a higher wRC+ then both Puig and Kemp. In fact, of all Reds with 400+ PA’s over that timespan, Winker sits 3rd behind only Votto and Zack Cozart (no longer with the team). Now keep in mind it’s a significantly smaller sample size than Votto and Cozart, but his trajectory through the minors and his first 470 big league PA’s tell us it is reasonable to expect this trend to continue. Steamer sees Winker as having eerily similar production as Puig with a wOBA of .354 and a wRC+ of 120. In comparison, Hamilton and Duvall — the two main hitters that will be replaced by the Puig/Kemp/Winker combo — are projected to continue their trend of being poor offensive values. Hamilton’s Steamer projections have him at a .284 wOBA and 75 wRC+ for 2019, while Duvall, now in Atlanta, projects as a .302 wOBA, 86 wRC+ hitter. Better run production means more runs. More runs means more wins. Steamer sees a combination of Puig, Kemp, and a full-time Winker as accounting for 5.1 wins above replacement. A Duvall, Hamilton, Ervin combo would project to provide 2.2 WAR.

Cincinnati was not a good team last season. Their management was not good. Their pitchers were not good. There offense showed promise, but ultimately…was not good. The good news is, the Front Office has done some really good things in putting the right players and coaches in the right places. With young guys like Castillo, Winker, Stephenson, Senzel, Hunter Greene, and Taylor Trammell either up or on their way, and a solid core of big leaguers in Votto, Gennett, Suarez, Puig, Wood, Kemp, and Roark, there is a lot of room for this team to grow. Just by acquiring Roark, Puig, Wood, and Kemp they’ve added a 3-win upgrade on offense and 3-win upgrade on the mount. They haven’t arrived yet, and unless they figure out a way to add one more rotation arm and bolster their bullpen I don’t see them becoming a playoff team. Yet they certainly have my attention and I’m excited to see if they can shock the baseball world. Pay attention to the rest of the offseason because come late-August, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Cincinnati be in contention. A finish of 80-85 wins by the end of 2019 is very much in the realm of possibilities.

However, when it comes to the highest paid players in baseball — pitchers more specifically — the list becomes a bit murky as to who deserves to be the highest paid players in the game. Jacob deGrom, who is coming off one of the best statistical seasons a pitcher has ever recorded in route to a Cy Young award, deserves to be alongside the Kershaws of the MLB. According to statisa.com, in 2018, the next four highest salaries amongst pitchers were Zack Greinke, Jake Arrieta, David Price, and Justin Verlander. While each is a proven and capable MLB-arm at the top of their respective rotations, it would be a mistake to consider four of them in the top 5 of baseball’s current best starting pitchers where deGrom has clearly staked a claim (side note: Verlander is the only one who should be included, not Kershaw. But I’ll save that for my next piece. **cue uproar**).

The top 5 pitchers in baseball, based on their value over the past 2–3 seasons are Chris Sale, Max Scherzer, Corey Kluber, Verlander and deGrom in no particular order. Obviously this is always subject to change going forward, but considering factors like age, durability, FIP, xFIP, K/BB, Runs Above Replacement (RAR), and Wins Above Replacement (WAR), there are few that threaten this list. Honorable mentions: Luis Severino, Aaron Nola, and shocker special, Carlos Carrasco. In this article though, I want to shed light on why deGrom, fresh off his historical season and in search of a contract extension with the Mets, is well deserving of being one of the highest paid players in baseball. With an impressive statistical track record, a somehow improving arsenal of pitches, and in the middle of his prime, deGrom is well worth building around.

The dollar value of a player has essentially become based on two big factors with a bunch of other tiny factors sprinkled in. Those two big factors are Runs Above Replacement (RAR) and more importantly Wins Above Replacement (WAR). Since front offices began looking at a player’s value in terms of his contribution to a win, the monetary value of 1 WAR has grown every season. As the value of WAR changes, so does the market for players.
So what does this mean for his potential contract extension in 2019? Well, let’s put it into value in dollars. In the three seasons that deGrom has thrown 190+ innings, he’s produced WARs of 4.3, 5.2, and 8.8. He was still able to produce a 3-win season in each of the two in which he didn’t surpass 150 innings. This past season he produced a RAR of 73.8, a tenth of a point behind NL MVP Christian Yelich, and a Mike Trout-level $70.1 million dollars in dollar value. Given the value of 1 WAR (~$8 million) in today’s market, his total value in dollars, over the first five years of his career is $197 million. That is not a predictive number, it is just a measure of his production. It’s basically stating that if the Mets wanted to let deGrom go and replace him through free agency, a rough estimate of how much they would have to shell out would be almost $40 million per year. That’s how much value in dollars they’d be losing in deGrom. However, this doesn’t take into account factors such as age, innings pitched, or injury risk — three things that are very prominent in the proper evaluation of the pitcher market. By using his past statistical production and taking into account innings pitched and injury history, identifying trends and making projections becomes easier when discussing a players monetary worth in contract negotiations. Given his upward career trajectory and minimal injury history, it’s a safe estimation that deGrom has 4–5 years left in his prime. If and when the Mets begin negotiating an extension, I would expect his agent to value him somewhere around the 7 year/$210 million contract that Scherzer got in 2015, if not higher due to the climb in market value of dollars/WAR.

When attempting to put a dollar value on a player, it’s important to look at injury history and innings pitched. However, his past work can’t be overlooked. Since deGrom debuted in 2014, he has the fifth most WAR out of all starting pitchers. His 2.67 ERA sits second best among all starting pitchers and 10th best among both starters and relievers. His 2.81 FIP is fourth best out of all starters and his 3.02 xFIP is seventh. He is in the discussion for the best pitcher in baseball based on his consistent ability to dominate offenses and stifle run production. One of the biggest contributing factors to that is his ability to limit contact. He ranks 13th in all of baseball since his 2014 debut with a K/9 of 10.03 and his K-BB rate is as dominant as it gets — 21.7%, good for seventh best over the last five seasons. He had always been considered a great pitcher — he began his career with two seasons of an FIP at 2.70 or below. And although his 2016 and 2017 were good, they were a bit down by his standards due to a spike in his BABIP. Given the fact that he was producing a higher rate of soft contact in 2016–2017 than in 2014–2015, it was likely that he was hit with some poor luck and due for regression. Based on his similar rates of getting people to swing and miss and his batted ball profile, 2018 really shouldn’t have been all that of a surprise. Quite frankly, I’m not sure how the Mets didn’t take advantage of trying to extend him prior to this season. That ship is now long gone.

His 2018 was so deGrominant (sorry, I had to) that realistically, he should have been the 2018 NL MVP. Yelich, whose extension by the way was perfectly executed by the Marlins in 2015 before being traded to Milwaukee, was worth 7.6 WAR — good for tops amongst NL position players. However, deGrom was worth an astounding 8.8 WAR. For as good as Yelich was, deGrom was worth more than a full win more. Realistically, he most likely fell victim to the comical “bad team, shouldn’t win MVP” idea that many like to throw out there. Nonetheless, award or not, he was easily the most valuable player in the National League. Not only that, but he produced one of the 11 best single seasons since 1989 by a pitcher. His 8.8 WAR ranks 11th over that timespan, but the ten performances that rank in front of him were produced by just five pitchers (Pedro Martinez, Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, Kevin Brown, Curt Schilling). Last time I checked, that’s pretty good company to be in.While all of this is impressive, the amazing thing that separates deGrom from the others is the fact that since his call-up in May of 2014, he has actually managed to increase the velocity on all four of his pitches each season. During his 2014 NL Rookie of the Year season, his average fastball velocity (vFA) was 94.5. This past season it was up to 96.7. The amount of pitchers that see that significant of an uptick in velocity during their age-30 season is scarce. Even Scherzer has never seen an uptick like deGrom. While still impressive, Scherzer has *only* managed to keep his vFA between 93.9–95.2 for 11 straight seasons. What’s even more remarkable is the fact that deGrom actually got better as this past season went on. From his first start of the season against the Cardinals to his last start against the Braves, he saw his vFA jump from 94.3 to 97.4. While most pitchers fall victim to fatigue towards the end of the season, deGrom managed to record his second highest fastball average velocity of the season in his final start.As the chart shows, deGrom has seen a gradual increase in the speed of his fastball. While Kershaw, Verlander, Scherzer, and Kluber were all able to sustain largely successful numbers over their first five seasons, deGrom has managed to not only improve upon his numbers, but also improve his overall stuff. With this trajectory, it’s hard to imagine his giant 2018 being a complete fluke. While a near 9-win season is unprecedented when it comes to pitchers, deGrom certainly has the stuff and the underlying metrics to make multiple 5.5-win seasons very feasible.
deGrom’s consistent dominance is incredible. With the average amount of innings that a starting pitcher gets through in a game decreasing every season, guys who can get through the order three or four times without getting “figured out” or losing velocity become extraordinarily valuable. According to Fangraph’s Splits tool, deGrom was 10th in the MLB in wOBA allowed third time through (TTT) the order at .262. For reference, that’s like facing a worse hitter than Billy Hamilton (.279 career wOBA) every time he went through an opposing teams lineup for the third time.

Over the last two seasons, deGrom has logged the third most innings pitching against a lineup TTT, while producing the seventh best wOBA allowed over that same timeframe. While it is reasonable to assume the more innings he throws will result in decreased production and velocity, there has been no indication of that occurring any time soon.
The Mets have made contractual mistakes in the past. Some by failing to execute, some by executing the wrong one. This is one they need to get done. There is enough evidence from evaluating deGrom that there is no reason for him to be paid less than the likes of Greinke, Price, and Arrieta. Nothing against them, but that just speaks to the kind of arm they have in Flushing, NY. deGrom may not have gotten the trophy for it, but the Mets have the most valuable player in the National League on their team. Don’t let him get away.