Base Running Run is the sum of several baserunning components.  GAR (Ground Advancment Runs, SBR (Stolen Base Runs), AAR (Air Advancement Runs), HAR (Hit Advancement Runs, and Other Advancement Runs (OAR).  BRR represents the number of runs contributed by a player’s advancement on the bases above what would be expected based on the number and quality of the base running opportunities with which the player is presented, park adjusted, and based on a multi-year run expectancy table.  When you’re looking at the average run value in terms of a base/out state you subtract average run value from actual run value on a particular play where a base runner is involved.  The result, the difference, is the run value awarded to the base runner.  Confused yet?  Here’s a basic scenario to clarify.  We have a runner on 2nd and 1 out …

A ground ball to the right side would automatically advance the runner to third.  But what about a ground ball to third?  Let’s say our same runner advances to third and our runner going to first is thrown out 25% of the time, he stays at 2nd Base 70% of the time, gets thrown out at 3rd 2% of the time and beats the throw to third 3% of the time (batter reaches on fielder’s choice).  Let’s say the average base/out run expectancy (RE) of all of those, weighted by the frequency of occurrence is .25 runs.  If the runner advances and the batter is nailed at first, the runner gets credit for .25 runs (.5-.25).  If he stays at second base, and the average RE is of a runner on second base with 2 outs is .23 runs … then he gets docked for -.02 runs (.23-.25).  A runner gets docked or credited for the resultant run value of what he does minus the average weighted resultant run value of ALL base runners in that situation.  Multiple baserunners can get positive or negative credit on a particular play.

Below are samples of situations where a runner can obtain positive of negative credit:

1. A hit, taking an extra base, not taking an extra base, getting thrown out trying to take an extra base (assuming there is no-one impeding his ability to advance).
2. A batter gets thrown out trying to take an extra base on a hit (if he is successful, we simply credit it as a ‘double’ for it.)
3. On a hit … the batter advancing, not advancing, getting thrown out while trying to advance when a runner is safe or out advancing an extra base.
4. Tagging up on a fly out.
5. Ground balls to the infield, runners stay out of a force or DP at 2nd base … whether or not the batter is out or safe on FC.
6. Runner on second advancing on GB to SS/3B or not or getting thrown out advancing.
7. Trail runner advancing, not advancing or getting thrown out when lead runner is safe or out trying to advance an extra base on a hit or an out (you can connect this scenario with #1)

Scenarios not considered …

A runner on 3B advancing, not advancing, or getting thrown out at home on a ground ball are not considered.  Runners advancing on WP or PB are also not considered.

All of the situations discussed are considered an opportunity for the base runner or batter.  The batter does enter the opportunity phase when he gets a hit unless the lead runner tries to advance an extra base and the batter has a chance to advance on the throw.

As we learned in the previous article, the value placed on base stealing players could be an inefficiency in the market, depending the success rate and frequency.  What about a great baserunner?  Could this be a piece of the pie that needs to be paid for before the rest of the baseball world catches on?  We entered the world of sabermetrics with teams paying for OBP … we correlated OBP with Runs and Runs with Wins.  Did we overlook the space between the notes.  Who are those base runners that add runs to their teams because of the ability to run the bases well?  Stay tuned to the next article- we’ll give you undervalued and overvalued players … and some prospects to keep an eye on.

Conceivably, the greatest leadoff man of all-time, Rickey Henderson’s most glaring attribute was his knack for disrupting a game with a stolen base.  Maury Wills was the first player to reach the century mark (104) in 1962 for the Dodgers.  It took another 12 years before Lou Brock, of the Cardinals, was able to eclipse the feat with 118 thefts.  The 80’s saw the likes of Rickey Henderson swipe 100 bags in a season three times, including a record 130 in 1982.  Vince Coleman ran wild from ’85-’87 totaling 326 thefts and three straight 100 steal seasons.  

As the 80’s closed out, Henderson snagged 93 bags for the Yankees and Coleman 81 for St. Louis in 1988.  Since then nobody has reached 80!  Only four men have ever reached the century mark, a total of eight times between them … and no-one has joined the club in 30 years.  Among the “sabermetricians” and “traditionalists” that make up the two political parties of baseball, the effect of the stolen base has often been debated.  The “Moneyball” approach does not implore a team to give away outs on the bases or on sacrifice situations.  It can be more station to station relying on the home run and walks.  While numerical charts in this article will support the more modern day approach, it’s hard to ignore the former World Series Champs, Kansas City Royals, and their small ball approach to the game.  The questions remains, with the tilt favoring the numbers game of going station to station, would a player like Henderson, create an inefficiency in the market place to the point where base stealers’ values would be purchased for pennies on the dollar and exploited for large value once proven statistically relevant again?

Using win and run expectancy models, the value of a person going from first to second base with no outs increases the chance of a team scoring by 19%, but going from a runner on first with no outs, to nobody on base with one out decreases the chance of a team scoring by 26%.  Another popular time to steal is with a runner on first and two outs.  The chances of a team scoring when a player goes from first to second base increases from 12.7% to 21.6% … an increase just shy of 9%.  However, remember, if the runner is thrown out the chances of scoring goes from 12.7% to 0%.  

So where are we going with this?  No statistic has a debate point of diminishing returns like the SB.  Experts have tried to place a single number on the point where a player is hurting his team if caught.  John Thorn estimates that a runner has to be successful 67% of the time to benefit his club.  I believe it varies based on the run scoring environment.  The higher the run scoring environment the less costly a “caught stealing” is.  If you’re confused, let’s look a basketball.  If two teams turn the ball over on average ten times a game, both are equally efficient, correct?  No.  It would depend on the number of possessions … or scoring environment.  A team with 100 possessions and 10 turnovers is theoretically hurt far less by the 10 turnovers than a team with 50 possessions.  Back out of the rabbit hole … Thorn was not far off.  In the next article I will explore this nuance in great detail, but for now trust me that a break even point lies somewhere between 67% and 73%.  So if Rickey Henderson is able to move from first to second at a clip greater than 73% and stealing 80 plus bases a season, his style of play would represent a huge inefficiency in the market place.

To place base stealing on an island by itself without “Baserunning Runs” metric would be irresponsible.  By themselves, they offer only a piece of the pie … but for now I am going to be irresponsible and capture the total base running picture in a following article.  To make my point, in the amazing 1982 season, where Rickey stole unfathomable 130 bases, he was caught 42 times (68%).  This season is considered less impressive in terms of base running metrics than his 1985 season in which he stole 80 bases and was caught 10 times (88,9%).  In the end stolen bases and baserunning are only a small part of the picture, but can certainly impact a win or a loss.  Stealing a base is still the most efficient way to advance, but being caught has an equally adverse effect. Guys like Beltran (86.4%), Raines (84.7), Coleman (80.9%), Lofton (79.5%), Brock (75.3%), Wills (73.8), and of course Henderson (76.2%) stole enough bases over their careers (300 or more) and had a success rate high enough to cause disruption in the physical/psychological world of baseball and in the analytic realm.  Their presence could cause a huge inefficiency in today’s market.  Today a guy with 40 SB’s will lead the league.  Who are 2019’s version of these unicorns?  As we search, don’t lose sight of the moral of the story … if you’re going to go, you better make it.