on sale now! Kindle edition ($9.99), paperback ($19.99)

order here -> https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09TPYMNSS (Kindle),

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09YNH354F (paperback)

Hardball Architects examines the trades, free agent acquisitions, draft picks and other transactions for the 30 Major League Baseball franchises, divided into a 2-volume set (American League and National League). All key moves are scrutinized for every team and Sabermetric principles are applied to the roster construction throughout the lifetime of the organization to encapsulate the hits and misses by front office executives. Team performances are analyzed based on transaction type with graphs depicting the WAR (Wins Above Replacement) in every decade. Individual results for each player-transaction is charted over the duration of their stint with the franchise. Every team chapter includes All-Time Rosters and Single-Season Leaders based on transaction type. The Team Trade Record chronicles the WAR and WS (Win Shares) accumulated by players acquired in comparison to those traded to opposing teams. The opening chapter is devoted to the Evolution of the General Manager and incorporates a discussion with former GM’s Fred Claire (Dodgers) and Mike Port (Angels, Red Sox) along with current GM Nick Krall (Reds) on a variety of front office topics. Prepare yourself for a journey through baseball history to discover the path to building a contending ball club!

About the Author

I am a New Jersey native with a passion for baseball, statistics, computers and video games who enjoys spending quality time with his family.

“Hardball Retrospective” is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. Supplemental Statistics, Charts and Graphs along with a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

“Hardball Retrospective – Addendum 2014 to 2016” supplements my research for Hardball Retrospective, providing retroactive standings based on Wins Above Replacement (WAR) and Win Shares (WS) for each “original” team over the past three seasons (2014-2016). Team totals from 2010 – 2013 are included for reference purposes. “Addendum” is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Retroactive”, published in June 2018, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. A cross-section of essays that I penned for Seamheads.com along with my Baseball Analytics blog spanning nearly a decade touching on subjects including “Taking the Extra Base”, “General Manager Scorecard”, “Worst Trades”, “BABIP By Location” and “Baseball Birthplaces and the Retro World Baseball Classic”. Rediscover your favorite hardball arcade and simulations in “Play Retro Baseball Video Games In Your Browser” or take a deep dive into every franchise’s minor league successes and failures in relation to their major league operations in “Minors vs. Majors”.

“Hardball Architects – Volume 1 (American League)”, published in July 2020, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Architects – Volume 2 (National League Teams)”, published in April 2022, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Architects” examines the trades, free agent acquisitions, draft picks and other transactions for the 30 Major League Baseball franchises, divided into a 2-volume set (American League and National League). All key moves are scrutinized for every team and Sabermetric principles are applied to the roster construction throughout the lifetime of the organization to encapsulate the hits and misses by front office executives.

on sale now!  – Kindle edition ($9.99) Paperback ($19.99)

Hardball Architects examines the trades, free agent acquisitions, draft picks and other transactions for the 30 Major League Baseball franchises, divided into a 2-volume set (American League and National League). All key moves are scrutinized for every team and Sabermetric principles are applied to the roster construction throughout the lifetime of the organization to encapsulate the hits and misses by front office executives. Team performances are analyzed based on transaction type with graphs depicting the WAR (Wins Above Replacement) in every decade. Individual results for each player-transaction is charted over the duration of their stint with the franchise. Every team chapter includes All-Time Rosters and Single-Season Leaders based on transaction type. The Team Trade Record chronicles the WAR and WS (Win Shares) accumulated by players acquired in comparison to those traded to opposing teams. The opening chapter is devoted to the Evolution of the General Manager and incorporates a discussion with former Dodgers GM Fred Claire on a variety of front office topics. Prepare yourself for a journey through baseball history to discover the path to building a contending ball club!

About the Author

I am a New Jersey native with a passion for baseball, statistics, computers and video games who enjoys spending quality time with his family.

“Hardball Retrospective” is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. Supplemental Statistics, Charts and Graphs along with a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

“Hardball Retrospective – Addendum 2014 to 2016” supplements my research for Hardball Retrospective, providing retroactive standings based on Wins Above Replacement (WAR) and Win Shares (WS) for each “original” team over the past three seasons (2014-2016). Team totals from 2010 – 2013 are included for reference purposes. “Addendum” is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Retroactive”, published in June 2018, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. A cross-section of essays that I penned for Seamheads.com along with my Baseball Analytics blog spanning nearly a decade touching on subjects including “Taking the Extra Base”, “General Manager Scorecard”, “Worst Trades”, “BABIP By Location” and “Baseball Birthplaces and the Retro World Baseball Classic”. Rediscover your favorite hardball arcade and simulations in “Play Retro Baseball Video Games In Your Browser” or take a deep dive into every franchise’s minor league successes and failures in relation to their major league operations in “Minors vs. Majors”.

“Hardball Architects – Volume 1 (American League Teams)”, published in July 2020, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Architects – Volume 2 (National League Teams)”, published in April 2022, is available in paperback and digital (Kindle) format at Amazon.com. 

“Hardball Architects” examines the trades, free agent acquisitions, draft picks and other transactions for the 30 Major League Baseball franchises, divided into a 2-volume set (American League and National League). All key moves are scrutinized for every team and Sabermetric principles are applied to the roster construction throughout the lifetime of the organization to encapsulate the hits and misses by front office executives.

I can hear Pete Rose and Ted Williams laughing all the way to the bank. Rose used bunting as an act of war on the pitcher. Of his 4256 hits, Rose had 65 bunt singles reaching base at a 69.9% clip. Do the math. Without the bunt, he would still be tied with Ty Cobb at 4,191.

In regards to the defensive shift, MLB introduced it in 1920. Ted Williams encountered it in 1940, as Lou Bourdeau and Cleveland Indians popularized it and saw the “Splendid Splinter” basically ignore it on his way to a career .344 BA and 521 home runs.

So how did we get here? Not to say correlation equals causation, but since James’ comments bunting usage has declined from 1.7% to .7%. At about the same time we saw defensive shifts increase from roughly 3,000 to 33,000 … that’s a 900% increase. The best bet in countering this defensive alignment is hitting a ground ball the opposite way, but its proven difficult to put in motion. Of the roughly 5,000 ground balls this season hit against the shift, less than 10% went to the opposite field. And of those opposite field ground balls only about 20% produced runs. If players could begin to do this on command it would prove to be ideal, because batters have produced well over a .500 average on such plays. Today’s analytic driven theories on hitting do not work that way.

Driven by launch angle, exit velocity and true outcomes, baseball analytics experts have looked past the simplest antidote: depending on the positioning of the fielders, bunt for a base hit. Depending upon the situation a soft ground ball the other way could prove to be as successful as a bunt. Since 2015 bunt attempts away from the shift have been successful to the tune of over 70% of the time, as opposed to opposite field ground balls having a success rate a shade under 50% of the time. The sample size isn’t large, but the evidence of success is at least worth a look.

To his defense, Bill James did later recognize that the “bunt could become valuable versus the shift.” Wouldn’t it be ironic if the same analytics driven approach that purest claim has ruined hitters abilities, could revitalize a new generation of hitters that handle the bat as opposed to just swing the bat. The bunt, opposite field hit, and dare I say, the hit and run could become the inefficiency that data analysts love to find. Hang on old school baseball guys, we could see the pendulum swinging back.

Here is a review of Hardball Retrospective by Gregg Kersey at “Gregg’s Baseball Bookcase” ->

Purchase Hardball Retrospective here:

Amazon

Here is a review of Hardball Retroactive by Lance Smith at “The Guy Who Reviews Sports Books” ->

Purchase Hardball Retroactive here:

Amazon

GooglePlay

Before we jump into his actual production, I think it’s important to note how Hall of Fame voting *should* take place. Player X should be evaluated in comparison to the others at his position when it comes to his hitting or pitching production. Comparing Larry Walker (right field) and Mike Piazza (catcher) would be less than ideal because the two played vastly different positions that included varying positional adjustments, as well as different expected positional run production — it is a lot more difficult to sustain a high level of run creation as a catcher, shortstop, centerfielder than say a corner outfielder or first basemen because of the toll playing those positions have on one’s body over the course of a season/career. Each position has its own variables that need to be taken into account and we are doing players a disservice while making a comparison if we note those variables for one player, while not even having the option of doing so for the other. Now, player value based on WAR is a bit different in that it is already weighted to balance out the positional scale, so to speak. So it’s easier to compare a catcher and a shortstop through WAR. I prefer comparing players to others at their position because it is a more seamless comparison. While WAR does a good job of balancing out those different variables, we still get a better picture of how good a player was at his particular position if we compare him to the entirety of that position.

In addition to focusing on the position group, I think it’s important to not get too caught up in the longevity of a player’s career, to an extent. Sure, if a player plays five years in the bigs and dominates each year before a career ending injury, then he probably shouldn’t be enshrined in the Hall of Fame. However, if someone plays 11 seasons and is dominant at his position for the majority of his career, a player who plays 20 seasons and is dominant for the same amount of years before significantly dropping off at the tail end of his career shouldn’t gain more merit simply because they played nine more years of below average to average baseball. Looking at WAR on a per season, per game, or per X amount of plate appearances basis would allow very worthy and underrated players to shine more than usual because they didn’t play excessive sub-replacement level years. In addition, it would allow us to see how some “legends” may have underperformed more than we were lead to believe.

Which leads us back to Wright…in terms of production over the course of one’s career, Wright is right there with the best of them. Among all third basemen with at least 6000 plate appearances since 1900, Wright sits tenth in wRC+ at 133, 16th in wOBA at .373, and ninth in OPS. Of the 34 third basemen with at least 350 career doubles, only one has less plate appearances than Wright, who sits 24th on the all time doubles list with 390. He is one of four third basemen in baseball history to hit more than 200 home runs and steal more than 190 bases in his career. Wright was the 12th most valuable third basemen at the plate in terms of offensive runs above average (“Off” on Fangraphs).

With offensive studs like Wade Boggs and George Brett closest to Wright in batting value, it’s fair to wonder why Wright doesn’t get more Hall of Fame love outside of Mets fandom. Of the top 30 third basemen in career WAR, Wright’s 52.3 sits a solid, yet probably unworthy of the Hall of Fame, 26th. What changes his outlook and makes that more impressive is that only two of those 30 played less games than Wright. Having found it difficult to find WAR data turned into rate stats rather than counting stats, I took the top 30 third basemen in career WAR and turned their total WAR into a WAR per 150 games played (WAR/150). It was very interesting to see certain guys already in the Hall of Fame drop, like Brooks Robinson, as well as seeing guys currently campaigning to get in rise, like Scott Rolen and Edgar Martinez (yeah, he was a 3B for a while before switching to DH). But for the purpose of the article, let’s stay focused on Wright.

*Note: I used 150 games instead of a full slate of 162 because it is incredibly uncommon for a player to play in all 162 games. There will be rest days, minor tweaks and bruises, etc.

While current members of the Hall like Brett, Santo, and Robinson did it longer, Wright was better than them on a per season basis. Don’t get it wrong, there is a lot to be said about someone who played at the highest level for a longer period of time, but if someone’s career ends after 11 seasons worth of games compared to 19 for another, we have to take into account what those players did on a per season basis. Career longevity should not be the ultimate deciding factor. Eleven full seasons in addition to three part time seasons, like Wright’s, is a lengthy career, yet it gets lost in translation when put up against certain Hall of Fame members who played an absurd 18+ seasons. For some reason the voting committee is infatuated with players who played well past their prime — when majority of those guys were borderline worthless in the twilight of their careers — like it’s some skill to take the field and produce at a sub-replacement level.

There are two third basemen in the Hall who played the same or less seasons than Wright. He sits ninth all-time with a WAR/150 of 4.95 — .05 WAR away from being one of nine third basemen to average five wins every full season. This tells us that while he wasn’t on the field as long as other Hall members, he was one of the most dominant at his position when he was. Fangraphs classifies a 4–5 WAR player as “All-Star” and 5–6 as “Superstar.” Given that scale, Wrights 11 full seasons worth of games at a All-Star to Superstar level of play is quite remarkable and vastly under-appreciated.

Another method I used in converting WAR into a rate stat was through WAR per 100 plate appearances (WAR/100 PA). Similar to the changes we saw when converting WAR to WAR/150, several players can be better identified as having a better Hall of Fame case, including Wright. Of the third basemen already enshrined, only five were more valuable per 100 PA than Wright was. Again, it appears as if voters like to add extra value to players who play more years, even if those years would’ve served the team better without that player.

A perfect example, and excuse the aside from Wright’s Hall of Fame case, of a player‘s career going far too long is Ken Griffey Jr. Now, before you get all upset, let it be known that I am in no way suggesting Junior should not be in the Hall of Fame. He should have been a unanimous induction, but for some reason couldn’t get three writers to include him on their ballot. However, the fact that he played 22 seasons should not have played into the decision to vote him in. Over his first 12 seasons, “the Kid” jumped out to an other-worldly 74.2 WAR — which without his last ten seasons would be good for sixth best all time amongst center fielders. Over those last ten years, he accumulated a WAR of 3.5. His counting stats kept piling up thanks to an extra decade, which masked his uselessness on a per season basis over that same decade. Using the WAR rate stats discussed earlier, Griffey’s first 12 seasons would’ve produced a WAR/150 of 6.63 (well above “MVP” level as described on Fangraphs WAR scale) and a WAR/100 PA of 1.01 (as seen on the chart above, only one third basemen with more than 6000 PA in the history of baseball averaged a WAR/100 of > 1). Thanks to his fantastically dreadful final decade, his career WAR/150 dropped to 4.36 and his WAR/100 PA to .69. If you broke up Griffey Jr. into two players, the first ending his career after those first 12 seasons and the second being the same Griffey Jr. who played all 22 seasons, the one who played just 12 would’ve had the more impressive career. For some reason we as fans, media, and other baseball community members have such an inclination to rely on counting stats to judge a player’s career, yet if we look between the lines, we see how misleading they can be.

Shifting back to Wright, two stats on Baseball-Reference that are excellent at portraying a player’s Hall of Fame worthiness in comparison to those already enshrined at his position are WAR7 (WAR over a player’s 7-year peak, not necessarily consecutive seasons) and JAWS (Jaffe WAR Score System). This is where we see some reasoning as to why Wright might not be suited for the Hall. The average WAR7 amongst third basemen in the Hall of Fame is 42.9 and the average JAWS is 55.6. Wright compares slightly below those averages at 40.2 WAR7 and 45.3 JAWS. In Wright’s case, I’m skeptical of putting too much emphasis on this compared to WAR/150 or WAR/100 PA. The reason his JAWS is farther from the Hall of Fame average than his WAR7 is because JAWS uses a player’s seven-year peak and averages it with the rest of a player’s career. As we saw over the last three seasons of Wright’s career, he couldn’t even play more than 38 games which expresses his value in JAWS as lower than his WAR/150 or WAR/100 PA might suggest.

All in all, the odds of David Wright making the Hall of Fame are slim, and I wouldn’t be totally surprised to see him stay on the ballot for just a couple of years. But based on his production and value through a per season perspective, Wright’s case is stronger than anyone thought — including myself. From his second year in the bigs in 2005 until 2013, Wright was the 4th most valuable player in all of baseball. While not voted by the media, he was far and away the most valuable player in the National League in 2007. Wright’s unfortunate injury ended his career earlier than I’m sure he had hoped. Luckily his value rate stats show that he belongs in the Hall of Fame discussion. Even if that’s a long shot, it should still be a sign that Hall of Fame voting needs an adjustment and the reliance on previous factors and misleading numbers is outdated.

Having spent most of the last decade cellar-dwelling, they are running out of time to make the most of having one of the five best hitters in baseball — Joey Votto. Even Votto hasn’t been able to save them from inescapable bottom-of-the-division finishes. Yet after a trade with the Los Angeles Dodgers, there’s a small probability that we may get to see that change this season. The big names of the trade, Yasiel Puig, Matt Kemp, and Alex Wood, all make their way to the Queen City, while Homer Bailey and change head back Los Angeles’ way with Bailey expected to be released within the coming weeks. You’d think with three All-Star names such as the aforementioned going to Cincinnati, people would be paying more attention to the Reds. However, with the Dodgers being one of the top-4 players in the Bryce Harper sweepstakes, it seems like the public wants to spend its time clamoring over the assumed inevitability of Harper going to LA following the Dodgers clearing of two outfield spots and a ton of dough. As much as I’d love to speculate on uncertainty, the Reds are doing things that should certainly incite excitement.

Luckily, I’m here to give Cincy the attention it deserves after the first three months of the offseason. While this latest move was quite the splash, the Reds were actually having a quietly solid offseason. Having won an unimposing 67 games in 2018, it appeared as if they had their sights set on the future with a solid farm-system, and a decent, yet unimpressive offense mixed with a severe lack of pitching on the big league club. The organization was being left behind by other teams who had modernized their player development and moved in an analytical and technological direction. Desperate for change, they hired former San Francisco Giants’ VP of Player Development, David Bell, to be their new manager. Having little managerial experience, aside from a minor league stint, Bell worked as the St. Louis Cardinals bench coach from 2015–2017. In 2017, he took the job in the Giants organization in an attempt to modernize their player development department (Byrne, par. 3). He wanted to utilize the vast amount of data and information available that other teams had already begun taking advantage of. In Bell, the Reds are joining the data and analytics movement that is providing baseball with so much growth and progress. Bell brought on previous Dodgers hitting coach, Turner Ward, to fill the same position with the Reds. Ward was instrumental in the development of one of the most lethal offenses in the bigs as well as the back-to-back National League Champions, and while not relevant until the Reds made their move for Puig, Ward is often known as “the Puig Whisperer” — something that will come in handy throughout 2019. Without having made a major on-field personnel move, the Reds were already brightening up their future trajectory.

At the conclusion of the 2018 season, it was pretty hard to just pick one hole for the Reds to fix. But their first significant player personnel move was made in order to make sure their bullpen didn’t get any worse in the future. Raisel Iglesias was extended for 3-years, $35 million, which was crucial considering the Reds had the 7th worst combined relief pitcher WAR and 9th worst xFIP (expected fielding independent pitching). Iglesias himself also had a down year, but he has a career 2.97 ERA, 3.46 FIP, and 10 K/9. All are extremely good numbers, and given the state of the rest of their bullpen, he was too valuable to let walk next season. At 28 years old, his 3-year contract is extremely team friendly. The bullpen is still a glaring weakness, and should their 2019 look similar to 2018, he becomes a great trade chip for a team looking to get a top relief pitcher on a reasonable contract. There is a good probability that Iglesias regresses back to his good career averages, but he alone can’t fix the overall state of the pen. Guys like Jared Hughes and David Hernandez are solid, if unspectacular, pieces, but at ages 32 and 33, they will most likely not be included in the organization’s future plans. If the Reds were smart, they would invest more in the incredibly deep free agent pool of relievers.

Next, Cincinnati aimed to find one starter who could shore up their bottom-5 pitching staff. The Reds starting pitchers combined to finish 2018 with the 6th worst ERA, 4th worst FIP, and 5th worst WAR (they were worth a combined 4.5 wins…), all while finishing bottom half of the league in K/9. Safe to say there was room for improvement. They aimed to revamp the rotation by trading for Tanner Roark from the Washington Nationals. While not flashy based on first glance at his numbers, this move was incredibly underrated. If one were to look at Roark’s season long numbers, his 4.34 ERA/4.27 FIP/4.42 xFIP line definitely underwhelms and fails to impress. However, his second half line of 3.43 ERA/3.85 FIP/4.23 xFIP tells a different story and falls in line with his career averages. By no means a Major League ace, Roark has spent multiple years as a part of a winning club in the regular season and has done so at a productive level. Taking advantage of his poor first half allowed Cincinnati to get a slight discount on a solid starting pitcher that is a clear upgrade for their staff. Luis Castillo has shown flashes of ace-like stuff, and with another year of development we may get to see him put it all together in year three. Cincinnati still has former top prospect Robert Stephenson who, if healthy, will provide them with another plus-stuff arm for the rotation.

The addition of Wood, Puig, and Kemp was the big flashy offseason move for the Reds. Wood can be a high-level starter or be a valuable addition to the bullpen, depending on what management decides to do with him. If they should decide to put him in the rotation, a 1–2–3–4 of Castillo-Wood-Roark-Stephenson suddenly becomes a sneaky good (and young) combination — Castillo and Stephenson are under team control for several more years. Should Wood be put in a high leverage bullpen role in tandem with Iglesias, Cincinnati would have a 1–2 punch at the back end of their bullpen that they haven’t had in some time.

While Wood is a significant piece and will add value to a struggling pitching staff (Woods 2018 WAR of 2.6 was more than half of the entire Reds’ starting pitchers combined), Puig will most likely make the biggest difference. In 2018, the Reds had five players with 175 or more plate appearances in their lineup with a wOBA of .335 or higher — Votto (1B), Scooter Gennett (2B), Eugenio Suarez (3B), Scott Schebler (RF/CF) and Jesse Winker (LF). The Reds will most likely be replacing defensive-minded and offensively inept Billy Hamilton (career wOBA of .279) with Puig. By doing so, Cincinnati downgrades a bit on defense — Hamilton’s 2018 UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) was a rock solid 5.9 — but the upgrade on offense makes it well worth it. Last season, Cincinnati trotted out Adam Duvall in LF for 89 games before trading him mid-season. His production was well below average. Following his departure, Phillip Ervin played the most innings in LF, splitting time with Winker, who also spent time in RF. While better than Duvall, Ervin’s production was quite average. Inserting Puig into the lineup in place of Hamilton and affording Winker a full time role in place of Duvall/Ervin is going to take the Reds’ offense to a new level. With seven hitters (not including top prospect Nick Senzel who could hit the ground running in his first full season) who can realistically produce 20 more runs above the replacement level player, the Reds have a decent chance of being a top 5–7 offense in baseball. We could very well be looking at the 2019 version of last seasons’ Colorado Rockies.

A look at this graph shows just how much of an improvement Puig and Kemp will be. Hamilton’s WAR was 1.3. The Duvall/Ervin combo was 1.1. Both Kemp and Puig contributed more wins above replacement in significantly less at-bats. Not to mention, both of them have spent their careers (majority for Kemp) hitting in the pitchers’ park that is Dodgers Stadium. In 2018, Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati was the 4th best hitters’ ballpark according to ESPN’s Park Factor statistic. For reference, Dodger Stadium was the 26th ranked hitters’ ballpark (5th worst). With an extended amount of plate appearances in a ballpark that provides a higher probability of run production, Puig is set up for really awesome numbers. And that’s not even taking into account the fact that Puig will continue to work with his hitting coach from the past three seasons. Over a full season, he will attribute much more value than either Hamilton or Duvall did over the past 3–4 seasons. According to Fangraphs’ Steamer projection model, we can expect Puig to have a wOBA of .352 and a wRC+ of 125.

As for Kemp, Steamer projections have him falling back down to Earth a bit and for good reason. His batting average on balls in play (BABIP) was uncharacteristically high during the first half of 2018, resulting in a jump in numbers. Once his BABIP regressed down to his career averages, his numbers dwindled as the season went on. Steamer has Kemp set up for a .348 wOBA and 106 wRC+ in a part time role. Kemp hits left handed pitching really well, but is a liability on defense. While not as impactful as Puig, Kemp will still bring value to an offense that has lacked big bats and proven run producers. Keeping him off the field against righties will enhance the team’s defense and allow him to be a valuable contributor on offense when in the lineup.

And we haven’t even discussed what Jesse Winker can do over the course of a full season. The former top prospect had a great 2018, albeit in a less-than-full-time position. With an increase in plate appearances in 2019, Winker should be a catalyst for the team’s offense, especially with veteran All-Stars like Puig, Kemp, Votto, and Gennett providing ample support. Since debuting in 2017, Winker actually has a higher wRC+ then both Puig and Kemp. In fact, of all Reds with 400+ PA’s over that timespan, Winker sits 3rd behind only Votto and Zack Cozart (no longer with the team). Now keep in mind it’s a significantly smaller sample size than Votto and Cozart, but his trajectory through the minors and his first 470 big league PA’s tell us it is reasonable to expect this trend to continue. Steamer sees Winker as having eerily similar production as Puig with a wOBA of .354 and a wRC+ of 120. In comparison, Hamilton and Duvall — the two main hitters that will be replaced by the Puig/Kemp/Winker combo — are projected to continue their trend of being poor offensive values. Hamilton’s Steamer projections have him at a .284 wOBA and 75 wRC+ for 2019, while Duvall, now in Atlanta, projects as a .302 wOBA, 86 wRC+ hitter. Better run production means more runs. More runs means more wins. Steamer sees a combination of Puig, Kemp, and a full-time Winker as accounting for 5.1 wins above replacement. A Duvall, Hamilton, Ervin combo would project to provide 2.2 WAR.

Cincinnati was not a good team last season. Their management was not good. Their pitchers were not good. There offense showed promise, but ultimately…was not good. The good news is, the Front Office has done some really good things in putting the right players and coaches in the right places. With young guys like Castillo, Winker, Stephenson, Senzel, Hunter Greene, and Taylor Trammell either up or on their way, and a solid core of big leaguers in Votto, Gennett, Suarez, Puig, Wood, Kemp, and Roark, there is a lot of room for this team to grow. Just by acquiring Roark, Puig, Wood, and Kemp they’ve added a 3-win upgrade on offense and 3-win upgrade on the mount. They haven’t arrived yet, and unless they figure out a way to add one more rotation arm and bolster their bullpen I don’t see them becoming a playoff team. Yet they certainly have my attention and I’m excited to see if they can shock the baseball world. Pay attention to the rest of the offseason because come late-August, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Cincinnati be in contention. A finish of 80-85 wins by the end of 2019 is very much in the realm of possibilities.

digital (Kindle) edition $9.99, paperback $22.99

“Hardball Retroactive” is a modest collection of selected articles that I have written for Seamheads.com along with my Baseball Analytics blog since 2010. Each piece is chosen based on audience response – a combination of social media “likes”, replies to a particular essay along with my personal favorites. Exclusive content is incorporated into the book – additional charts and graphs that were omitted from the original posts as well as three new compositions.

Subjects – General Manager Scorecard, Taking the Extra Base, Fun Facts About Inside-the-Park Home Runs, Best Pitchers Who Never Threw a No-Hitter, The Journey From Expansion to Competitive Team, Worst Trades Since 1950, Rotisserie vs. Reality, BABIP By Location, Baseball Birthplaces and the Retro World Baseball Classic, Play Retro Baseball Video Games In Your Browser, Minors vs. Majors